Do not open a public issue containing credentials, call artifacts, exploit payloads, or device identifiers. Use GitHub's private vulnerability-reporting feature for this repository. For an upstream defect, report it to the relevant upstream maintainer.

Public Compute Services 1.0.6 has two important unresolved risks:

1. A user-supplied manifest repository value is interpolated into a root shell command without robust escaping. This repository's configuration script accepts only a 40-character commit and constructs the URL itself. Do not paste arbitrary PCS URLs.
2. PCS runs an unauthenticated gRPC proxy on predictable ports 7270–7273 and binds beyond loopback. A local app may connect to it or win a bind race. Network policy may block LAN access, but that does not remove the local-app risk.

PCS also relies on private Android TLS hooks, includes non-reproducible libsekret.so binaries, and trusts the selected manifest publisher. Read upstream source and issues before installing it on a daily-driver phone.

Vector and NeoZygisk run inside privileged Android processes. A defect in either can crash Zygote or system_server. Keep a stock init_boot.img and a tested module-disable recovery path.

• Root and an unlocked bootloader reduce the device's security guarantees.
• Any app with root access can read or alter call artifacts.
• S3 stores highly sensitive audio and metadata; keep Block Public Access enabled.
• Bedrock and Transcribe are external processors. Confirm residency, retention, and legal/consent requirements before use.
• Call recording laws vary. Obtain every participant's consent where required.

Before every commit:

python3 scripts/public_safety_check.py --root .
gitleaks git --redact

Public GitHub secret scanning and push protection should remain enabled. If a secret ever reaches Git history, rotate it immediately; deleting it in a later commit is not enough.