fix(entrypoint): stop touching /app and /config, and share one write probe - #254
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…probe Four issues, three of them found by testing the paths rather than reading them. `adduser -h /app` made the application directory the service user's home, so adduser chowned it and /app came out owned by PUID:PGID on every start — the property the read-only-app-dir work set out to remove. Moving the home to /config was worse: adduser then chmod'd the operator's config directory from 600 to 2755. `-H` stops it creating or touching any home at all, which is safe because HOME is set explicitly on both exec paths. The ownership sweep used `find | chown -h`, which resolves each path afresh — `-h` covers only the final component, so an intermediate directory swapped for a symlink mid-sweep redirects root's chown outside /config. scripts/fix_ownership.py walks with os.fwalk, which owns the directory descriptors and does not follow symlinks. The write probe existed only on the root path; rootless still used `test -w`, which passes on a mode-600 directory. Both paths now call one require_writable_config, so the same rejection applies either way. Rootless never reached any of that: `ln -sf … /etc/localtime` cannot run as a non-root user and `set -e` killed the script on line 14. The symlink is now best-effort — TZ in the environment still applies. Verified in containers across all four combinations: root and rootless each start on a normal /config and refuse a mode-600 one, /app stays 0:0, and the config directory's mode is left untouched in every case.
Assigned on both the rootless and root paths and never read — not exported, not referenced anywhere else in the repo, not consumed by the application. Removing both clears the only shellcheck warning in the file.
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Included review availability: 0 reviews are currently available. Your included PR review attempts over the past 7 days set your current allowance at 1 review per hour. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe Docker image now includes a symlink-safe ownership utility. The entrypoint uses write probes for ChangesConfiguration ownership handling
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to This change consolidates configuration write validation, avoids modifying application and configuration directory metadata, and restores rootless startup behavior; no actionable merge-blocking risk remains beyond normal checks and review. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
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Inline comments:
In `@scripts/entrypoint.sh`:
- Around line 19-22: In scripts/entrypoint.sh, shorten the comment at lines
19-22 to no more than two instructional lines, shorten the comment at lines
33-35 likewise, and remove the before/after narrative at lines 68-69 while
retaining only the current behavior or guarded condition.
In `@scripts/fix_ownership.py`:
- Line 30: Update the ownership-fix flow around os.fwalk so it also changes
ownership of the /config root directory represented by root_fd, not only its
child entries. Ensure the root directory is corrected before the writable-config
probe runs, while preserving the existing handling for descendants.
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Dockerfilescripts/entrypoint.shscripts/fix_ownership.py
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os.fwalk yields the entries within each directory and never the root, so switching from `find /config …` — which includes its starting point — quietly stopped correcting /config's own ownership. A root-owned config directory then survived the sweep, the probe could not create its file, and the container exited instead of self-healing. Reproduced against the previous commit: FATAL, with the directory left at 0:0. It now starts and the directory becomes 1000:1000. Also trims four comment blocks to the two-line cap.
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Closes the gaps left by #253. Three of the four issues were found by exercising the paths in containers rather than reading them.
/app was still being chowned to the service user
adduser -h /appmade the application directory the service user's home, so adduser chowned it —/appcame out owned byPUID:PGIDon every start, which is the property #253 set out to remove. The contents stayed root-owned, so it was the directory inode only, but it still let the service create files beside its own code.Moving the home to
/configturned out worse: adduser then chmod'd the operator's config directory from 600 to 2755.-Hstops it creating or touching any home at all, which is safe becauseHOMEis set explicitly on both exec paths.The ownership sweep could be redirected outside /config
find /config … -exec chown -hresolves each path afresh.-hcovers only the final component, so an intermediate directory swapped for a symlink mid-sweep sends root's chown elsewhere.scripts/fix_ownership.pywalks withos.fwalk, which owns the directory descriptors and does not follow symlinks.The write probe was only on one path
#253 replaced
test -wwith a create-and-remove probe — but only where the container runs as root. The rootless path still usedtest -w, which passes on a mode-600 directory. Both now call onerequire_writable_config, so the same rejection applies either way.Rootless mode never got that far
ln -sf … /etc/localtimecannot run as a non-root user, andset -ekilled the script on it, so rootless containers exited before reaching any of the above. The symlink is now best-effort;TZin the environment still applies.Verified
All four combinations, in containers:
/config/appstays0:0/config/config/etc/localtime)/configAlso removes two
USER_NAMEassignments that were never read, clearing the file's only shellcheck warning.Summary by CodeRabbit